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Research demonstrates that information sharing is facilitated by familiarity, and having a
common understanding of problems, use of lexicon, and semantic meaning. These factors
can be difficult to develop within extreme environments such as disasters as members of
the multi-agency system that responds often have limited experience of working
together. Public inquiries repeatedly highlight the impact of information sharing difficulties
on public safety, but limited academic research has focused on identifying concrete
behaviours that facilitate interteam information sharing within such environments. This
paper presents a case study of a national disaster response exercise involving 1,000
emergency responders. Data consist of structured observations, recordings of interteam
meetings, and interviews with emergency responders. Results of mixed-method analysis
indicate that interteam information sharing is delayed by limited situation awareness and
poor articulation. Conversely, adopting behaviours that promote common frames for
understanding interteam capabilities and information requirements improves information
sharing and potentially reduces cognitive effort required to process information. Findings
contribute to interteam communication theory by highlighting that in complex, time-
constrained environments, having a shared understanding of responsibilities and
information requirement is important for minimizing redundant deliberation and
improving relevance and speed.
Practitioner points
 Facilitating the exchange and interpretation of relevant information is important for improving situation
assessment, decision-making, and the implementation of appropriate actions for addressing risks.
 Interteam information sharing can be particularly challenging when teams are comprised of members
from across different organizations with different language and cultures that must form ad hoc to
rapidly respond to problems in extreme environments.
 Adopting communication strategies that develop common frames-of-reference can facilitate
information sharing and interteam responses to disasters.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Sara Waring, Critical and Major Incident Psychology Research Group, Department of
Psychology, University of Liverpool, Bedford Street South, Liverpool L69 7ZA, UK (email: s.k.waring@liv.ac.uk).
DOI:10.1111/joop.12217
1
Naturalistic decision-making (NDM) seeks to describe howdecisions aremade in dynamic
real-world contexts characterized by time pressure, risk, uncertainty, and lack of
excessive or incomplete information (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas,
2001). Findings from this domain highlight the importance of having access to relevant
information for developing an accurate understanding of what is happening and how this
might progress (referred to as situation awareness or SA; Endsley, 1995, 2000, 2015) so
that decisions and actions taken are appropriate to the situation (Rankin, Dahlb€ack, &
Lundbery, 2013). Failure to share or pay attention to relevant information can lead to
increased uncertainty and delayed decision-making (Alison et al., 2015), resulting in
devastating consequences, as disasters such as the Clapham Rail Crash and Cumbrian
Shootings demonstrate (Pollock, 2013). Understanding what facilitates information
sharing is therefore vital to improving SA and decision-making in ‘extreme’ environments,
including disasters (DeChurch et al., 2011), military operations (DeCostanza, DiRosa,
Jimenez-Rodrıguez, & Cianciolo, 2014), and medical emergencies (Mathieu, Marks, &
Zaccaro, 2001).
However, the complexity of these contexts and the multiteam systems (MTSs) that
form to respond can make it difficult to develop facilitators traditionally associated with
effective information sharing, such as familiarity (Ren & Argote, 2011), trust (Jarvenpaa &
Keating, 2011), and shared appreciation of ‘who knows what’ (Heavey & Simsek, 2015;
Wegner, Guiliano, & Hertel, 1985). Differences in responsibilities, goals, and expertise
can create barriers for knowing what information to share with whom, when, and how to
interpret information. As advocated by NDM researchers (Burke, Salas, Estep, & Pierce,
2007), it is therefore important to study teams ‘in the wild’ to develop interventions of
relevance to improving performance within these contexts.
Drawing on data from a UK Home Office funded disaster exercise, we seek to build
upon theories of team communication by identifying concrete behaviours that improve
interteam information sharing in extreme environments. Such research poses implica-
tions for translating theory into practice and demonstrating the types of activities that aid
with balancing shared (Salmon, Stanton, Walker, & Jenkins, 2009) and distributed
(Stanton et al., 2006) SA across complex networks.
Disaster context: multiteam systems and situation awareness
Disasters are events that threaten large-scale damage to human welfare and security,
requiring a multi-agency response (London Emergency Services Liaison Panel [LESLP],
2015). Similar to many countries, the United Kingdommanages these incidents through a
three-tiered hierarchical command structure, with decisions being fed from Strategic
(responsible for setting overall objectives) to Tactical (setting parameters and level of
autonomy for Operational to work to) and Operational (managing the incident ground)
Commanders (LESLP, 2015). This structure is characterized by: (1) high skill differenti-
ation between teams; (2) high authority differentiation with figures from each agency
across each layer of command responsible for making key decisions; and (3) low stability
as the MTS (team of teams; Marks, DeChurch, Mathieu, Panzer, & Alonso, 2005) forms ad
hoc in response to an incident and disbands immediately afterwards (for a taxonomy of
teams see Hollenbeck, Beersma, & Schouten, 2012).
As with other MTSs, the agencies involved in managing disasters share overarching
superordinate goals at the multiteam level (save lives, reduce risks), but unique subgoals
(LePine, Piccolo, Jackson, Mathieu, & Saul, 2008; Marks et al., 2005) at team andmember
levels. For example, during a disaster police may need to collect evidence and conduct
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investigations, whilst fire and ambulance focus on extracting and treating casualties.
Common superordinate goals are insufficient for improving performance (Power &
Alison, 2016); component teams must also coordinate and prioritize the order in which
subgoals are addressed to avoid conflicting actions (Mathieu et al., 2001). Exchanging,
integrating, and interpreting information is therefore important for informing SA at
individual (Endsley, 2000), team (Endsley & Jones, 1997; Wright, Taekman, & Endsley,
2004), and multiteam levels to ensure that subgoals between teams and agencies are
compatible and directed towards achieving superordinate goals (Davison, Hollenbeck,
Barnes, Sleesman, & Ilgen, 2012). However, the extent to which teams across the MTS
need to have a shared situation awareness (SSA) in order to promote effective
coordination of subgoals requires further focus.
At the individual level, SA is important for ensuring that decisionsmade are appropriate
to the situation and are implemented in a timely manner (Alison et al., 2015). Effective
teamwork requires that all members have the SA needed to address their responsibilities,
referred to as team situation awareness (TSA; Endsley & Jones, 1997). For TSA to develop,
knowledge of team roles, capabilities, and interpersonal relationships are needed
(Berggren, Johansson, Baroutsi, Turcotte, & Tremblay, 2014), along with an element of
SSA across members to promote coordination (Cooke et al., 2003). However, seeking to
develop complete SSA across the MTS and to share all information with everyone would
become overwhelming, resulting in attention being misdirected away from important
aspects of tasks (Stanton et al., 2006).
Accordingly, researchers studying cognition within complex networks highlight the
value of taking a systems approach that sees cognitive processes as being dispersed across
members rather than solely residingwithin individuals (Stanton et al., 2006). SA is viewed
as being distributed (DSA), connectingmembers to a task on a ‘moment-by-moment’ basis
(Stanton, 2016). Similar to the concept of MTSs in which teams have different subgoals
that need to be coordinated to achieve a superordinate goal (Davison et al., 2012), DSA
implies different, yet compatible, goals and information requirements thatmay sometimes
overlap for particular tasks (Nazir, Sorensen, Overgard, & Manca, 2014; Saner, Bolstad,
Gonzalez, & Cuevas, 2009). Thus, effective information sharing does not mean that all
information should be exchangedwith everyone, but rather that eachmember has access
to information of relevance to the function they serve when they need it (Stanton, 2016;
Stanton et al., 2006).
In this respect, DSA is not only beneficial for understanding the importance of being
selective in sharing information, but also provides criteria for judging the quality of
information shared based on relevance to recipients’ functions. However, DSA provides
less focus on explaining how this can be achieved. Identifying behaviours that promote
ability to share and make sense of relevant information within complex networks such as
MTSs is important for improving practice.
Information sharing
Macrocognitive research into complex cognitive functions in real-world contexts
identifies a range of barriers that can prevent relevant information from getting to where
it is needed (Schraagen & Van de Ven, 2011). For example, disasters tend to be managed
using ahierarchical, centrally controlled command structure (Schraagen,Huis in ‘t Veld,&
De Koning, 2010). This can create barriers for sharing information because the priorities
that need to be rapidly addressed often lie at a lower level to where information is being
funnelled for commands to be issued (Scholtens, 2008). As different command levels are
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often geographically dispersed and unable to communicate face to face, the amount of
information shared becomes further reduced (Martin & Bal, 2006; Zika-Viktorsson,
Sundstr€om, & Engwall, 2006). Consequently, decision-makers may have limited access to
the information they need.
Conversely, theremay be timeswhen toomuch information is available, placing strain
on decision-makers already operating under cognitive constraints due to environmental
complexities (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz et al., 2001). According to Data/Frame Theory,
adopting a ‘frame’ or internal perspective to make sense of an event can reduce cognitive
effort by allowingpeople to be selective overwhat information they attend to andhow it is
interpreted (Klein, Moon, & Hoffman, 2006a, 2006b). This is a two-way process as data
can also influence the frame applied (Baber, Attfield, Conway, Rooney, & Kodagoda,
2016), making it important for decision-makers to have access to relevant data to test the
suitability of their frame. In this respect, Data/Frame Theory provides an important
contribution by identifying cognitive mechanisms that influence how people receive,
select, and interpret information. However, the theory is limited by the lack of focus
directed towards identifying behaviours that can improve access to relevant information,
and the influence of the sender on the recipient’s ability to recognize information as
relevant.
One concept that may shed light on the role of the sender is representational gaps
(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Similar to Data/Frame Theory, representational gaps research
posits that how problems are conceptualized affects what information is viewed as being
relevant to attend to and share, and how it is interpreted (Bechky, 2003; Mendonca,
Jefferson, & Harrald, 2007). However, this concept also highlights that differences in
expertise and practices across teammembers can lead to differences in howproblems are
conceptualized (Cronin & Weingart, 2007; Weingart, Cronin, Houser, Cagan, & Vogel,
2005). This can result in failures to share information of relevance to others (Sandhaland,
Oltedal, Hystad, & Eid, 2015), as well as to implementing actions that work against one
another (Cronin, Bezrukova,Weingart, & Tinsley, 2011; Firth, Hollenbeck, Miles, Ilgen, &
Barnes, 2015). Findings pose implications for Data/Frame Theory and DSA by indicating
that a potential barrier to the availability of relevant information is the extent towhich the
sender and recipient share a common understanding of the problem.
Evidence also highlights that differences in roles and expertise can lead to disparities in
communication between sender and recipient, affecting whether messages can be
interpreted. Differences in cultures, command structures, and procedures of agencies
involved in disaster response can lead to knowledge boundaries (Kotlarsky, van den
Hooff, & Houtman, 2015), including differences in specialist terminologies or using
different words to talk about the same object (syntactic boundaries; Bechky, 2003), and
attaching different meanings to the samewords (semantic boundaries; Boland & Tenkasi,
1995). If members are unable to understand messages, they are unlikely to view them as
being relevant to their area of practice (pragmatic boundaries), leading to such
information being ignored (Jarvenpaa & Keating, 2011). Knowledge boundaries research
poses implications for Data/Frame Theory by highlighting that how information is
communicated affects whether the recipient can correctly recognize its relevance.
Further team-based research identifies that concepts such as familiarity and trust
(Jarvenpaa & Keating, 2011; Ren & Argote, 2011) are important for improving the
relevance of information sharing. However, these can be difficult to develop during acute
phases of a disaster as agencies usuallywork independently of one another on a day-to-day
basis (Shuffler, Jimenez-Rodrıguez, & Kramer, 2015), membership is fluid due to changes
in working shifts (Allison & Shuffler, 2014), and expertise may need to be combined in
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new ways to address unique challenges (Goodwin, Essens, & Smith, 2012; Luvison &
Marks, 2012).
Thus, many organizations have sought to invest in preparation activities (Maynard,
Mathieu, Rapp, & Gilson, 2012) that can be beneficial for improving performance during
acute phases, such as gaining work experience across a range of relevant functional
domains (Cuijpers, Uitdewilligen, & Guenter, 2016; de Vries, Walter, van der Vegt, &
Essens, 2014). Evidence highlights that these activities lead to quicker exchange of
relevant information as members become better able to identify what to share (Schraagen
et al., 2010) and where knowledge resides across the team (in line with transactive
memory systems; Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1985). It may be that such activities help
to reduce representational gaps by promoting shared understanding of one another’s
responsibilities and the problem. From Data/Frame Theory and knowledge boundaries
perspectives, such activities may also be beneficial for developing common frames-of-
reference for using and interpreting words (Cronin et al., 2011; Rentsch & Staniewicz,
2012). These common frames can reduce idiosyncratic perceptions (Dierdorff, Surface, &
Brown, 2010), improve accuracy, consistency of judgements (Schleicher & Day, 1998),
interteam communication and coordination (Firth et al., 2015), as well as freeing up
cognitive capacity to focus on other aspects of tasks such as ensuring actions across teams
are aligned to shared superordinate goals (Schmidt & DeShon, 2007).
Emergency responders also invest in joint activities such as large-scale training
exercises to familiarize themselves with one another’s procedures. However, such
activities often rely on voluntary actions (Scholtens, 2008) and are costly to implement,
limiting the frequency of their occurrence. In the United Kingdom, agencies involved in
disaster response are split into ‘Category 1’ (emergency services, health bodies, and local
authorities) who serve a leading role, and ‘Category 2’ (including utility companies and
local businesses) who provide support when disasters affect their sector (UK Civil
Contingencies Act, 2004). Category 2 agencies tend to be less regularly involved in
disaster response and preparation activities, which may limit familiarity, causing
disparities in ‘frames’ adopted to interpret the situation. Each incident is also unique,
which may raise novel issues regarding roles and responsibilities that previous
preparatory activities have not addressed. It is therefore important to consider whether
there are behaviours that could help agencies to develop shared understanding of roles,
responsibilities, and requirements within the acute phase of an incident in order to better
communicate information that will be accurately recognized as relevant.
Current research
Existing research highlights the importance of sharing relevant information in a manner
that can be easily understood if it is to be effectively used to test frames, develop SA, and
coordinate subgoals across a MTS. However, theories such as DSA and Data/Frame are
limited because they do not focus on the role of the sender and their impact on the ability
of the recipient to utilize information. Nor do they identify what concrete behaviours
improve ability to share and attend to information within extreme environments. This is
an important step for translating theories into practice, developing interventions that train
specific skill sets that can be tested.
Accordingly, the current study seeks to address the following question: ‘what
behaviours improve and hinder the exchange of interteam information sharing in extreme
environments where teams have limited experience of working with one another?’ We
take a field-based approach in order to collect rich, in-depth data during a Home Office
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funded national disaster exercise designed to replicate the complexity of a real incident.
This approach allows us to focus on behaviours in context (Alison et al., 2013), as
advocated by the NDM domain (Burke et al., 2007).
Method
Participants and scenario
Data were collected using naturalistic observation, a method for accessing rich data to
develop in-depth understanding of human behaviour in situ (Bashir, Afzal, & Azeem,
2008), allowing interteam communication practices to be observed within an extreme
environment. This method is frequently used within NDM research to explore how
human cognition adapts to complexity, and is beneficial for developing evidence bases to
informprofessional practice and training (Gore, Flin, Stanton,&Wong, 2015).Naturalistic
observations were made during a 9-hr exercise that involved 1,000 practitioners from
across Category 1 (Police, Fire and Rescue, Ambulance, National Health Service England,
Local Council) and Category 2 agencies (Environment Agency, gas, electricity and water
companies), Royal Air Force and Government. Additionally, 175 members of the public
and actors played the role of casualties, and media agencies were present to generate
further realism. To preserve anonymity and prevent exercise disruption, demographics
were not recorded.
Overall, the exercise comprised two sites. The first was a physical construction of a
train that had derailed and collided with a multistory building (Sector one), several
vehicles and power lines (Sector two), and had caused a bus to crash into an adult learning
centre (Sector three). Police, Fire, and Ambulance Operational Commanders were based
across this incident ground. The second site consisted of a Command Centre approx-
imately five miles away from the incident ground. All Strategic and Tactical Commanders
were based here, except for the Fire Service Tactical Commander who was based on the
incident ground. A Fire Service Tactical liaison was present in the Command Centre to
relay messages and information, as is the usual structure in the United Kingdom.
Data collection
This study predominantly focuses on information sharing at Strategic and Tactical levels
because these levels are responsible for making complex decisions regarding superor-
dinate goals, priorities, and resource allocation. The data have been drawn from across
three sources (meeting transcripts, observations, and interviews) in order to increase the
rigour and validity of findings through data triangulation (Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka,
2008).
Meeting transcripts
The primary source of data consists of transcriptions of five Tactical and four Strategic
meetings that took place across the 9-hr period, providing an accurate and in-depth
account of communication practices (what was said, by whom and when). These
meetingsprovided aplatform for agencies to exchange information inorder to understand
the situation and risks involved, to identify strategies, assign actions, and consider the
shared superordinate goals of saving life and reducing harm. The frequency and regularity
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of such meetings is not set by protocols, but is dependent on the dynamic nature of each
incident.
In total, 15 practitioners from across 12 agencieswere present in Strategic and Tactical
meetings. Information sharingbetween agencies at Strategic andTactical levels tookplace
via verbal communication within these meetings. Information was also fed to these
Commanders by a larger network of practitioners located within the Command Centre
and on the incident ground using radio communication devices. Each emergency service
had a radio channel that was used to share information within the agency across the
command structure. Practitioners at Strategic and Tactical levels chose whether to share
this information with other agencies verbally.
The average meeting length was 26 min for Tactical and 32 min for Strategic (see
Table 1). The first Strategic meeting was particularly long due to Commanders delaying
discussions to wait for updates from the first Tactical meeting that had continued beyond
the allotted timeslot. As Table 1 shows, this pattern in delayed information sharing across
hierarchical levels continued throughout the incident due to overlaps in meetings and
media briefings. The impact of this will be discussed in the Results section.
Observer ratings
Eight subject-matter experts (SME) observed Strategic and Tactical meetings to assess the
quality of information sharing and collaboration between agencies. Four of these
observers were academics specialized in decision-making and communication research,
and four were emergency service practitioners with between eight and 37 years of
experience (average experience = 17 years). A combination of academic and practi-
tioner SMEs were teamed up across locations to provide a more robust evaluation of
performance.
All observers used a standardized observation-coding sheet in order to provide
consistency in the behaviours assessed. Observations were coded in terms of: (1)
communication (the extent to which agencies communicated clearly and concisely with
one anotherwithout using jargon- or agency-specific acronyms); and (2) SSA (the extent to
which agencies exchanged information to develop a shared understanding of the incident
and how itmay progress). Behaviours were scored on a scale of 0 (completely absent) to 2
(consistently present throughout the meeting). Sheets also provided space for general
Table 1. Tactical and Strategic meeting and media briefing lengths
Tactical meeting length Strategic meeting length Overlaps
1st: 37 min (11:39 a.m.–12:16 p.m.) 1st: 47 min (11:55 p.m.–12:42 p.m.) 21 min
2nd: 36 min (13:26 p.m.–14:02 p.m.) Media briefing 1: 15 min (13:32 p.m.–13:47 p.m.) 15 min
2nd: 23 min (14:05 p.m.–14:28 p.m.)
3rd: 19 min (15:02 p.m.–5:21 p.m.)
4th, part 1: 2 min
(15:57 p.m.–15:59 p.m.)
4th, part 2: 14 min
(17:03 p.m.–17:17 p.m.)
3rd: 43 min (16:35 p.m.–17:18 p.m.) 14 min
Media briefing 2: 19 min
(17:37 p.m.–17:56 p.m.)
5th: 16 min (18:34 p.m.–18:50 p.m.)
4th: 17 min (19:34 p.m.–19:51 p.m.)
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observational notes to explain performance ratings given. Interclass correlations were
conducted to measure inter-rater reliability between the four Strategic (communication:
R = .73, p < .05; SSA: R = .71, p < .05) and four Tactical observers (communication:
R = .93, p < .001; SSA: R = .80, p < .05), which indicated a substantial-outstanding level
of agreement. Due to the small number of observations conducted (7 per SME), caution is
recommended in interpreting the reliability of this analysis.
In order to allow distinctions in the quality of communication to be identified over
time, scores were averaged across three equal time points (10 a.m.–1 p.m.; 1 p.m.–
4 p.m.; and 4 p.m.–7 p.m.) and converted into percentages (e.g., 100% = all observers
noted a behaviour as being consistently present throughout all of their observations
within a 3-hr time period; 0% = behaviourwas consistently absent). This was achieved by
adding all observer scores at each time point for Strategic and Tactical levels and dividing
by the maximum score achievable based on the number of observations made.
Interviews
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with three Strategic and four Tactical
Commanders from across emergency services (mean interview length = 18 min;
minimum = 12 min; maximum = 30 min) immediately post-exercise to capture initial
reflections of communication processes during the incident. Questions were developed
based on the researchers’ previous experience of observing large-scale disaster exercises
and conducting post-incident debriefs with emergency services after real disasters.
Interviews were semi-structured, the order in which questions were asked could be
altered and additional questions asked depending on interviewee responses.
Overall, interviews initially consisted of questions designed to encourage Comman-
ders to begin reflecting on the incident, such as: ‘What was your role?’; ‘What were you
initially faced with?’; and ‘What was the most challenging aspect?’. They were then asked
questions relating to communication and information sharing practices, such as: ‘What
strategies were used to communicate within your own agency/with other agencies?’;
‘How did you personally seek to ensure effective communication within your agency/
between agencies?’; and ‘What do you think were the most important factors that
enabled/hindered emergency services from working well together and why?’. These
interview transcripts serve as an additional source of qualitative data to contrast with
meeting transcripts that are based on the personal reflections of those who were
responsible for managing the incident.
Analysis
Observer ratings are presented in the form of descriptive statistics and are used as
supporting data to demonstrate changes in performance over time, based on the
assessments of academic and practitioner SMEs. Transcriptions of meetings and
interviews were qualitatively analysed using thematic analysis, a form of qualitative
analysis that allows common themes to be identified based on content in order to derive
meaning (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). Frequencies are also provided for each theme, in line
with a content-analytical approach (Jones, Coviello, & Tang, 2011), to demonstrate
patterns in information sharing practices across meetings over time.
To avoid missing key content within the rich dataset, an inductive data-driven
approach was adopted rather than having pre-defined themes (Frith & Gleeson, 2004).
The first stage of analysis consisted of transcribing audio recordings of meetings and
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interviews. Video footage was used to support the identification of speakers within
meetings. A total of 18,103 words were spoken across Strategic meetings (average per
meeting = 4,526), 38,710 across Tactical meetings (average = 7,742), and 18,467 across
interviews (average per interview = 2,638). Transcripts were read several times to
identify the subset of data relevant to understanding what practices facilitated and
hindered information sharing, resulting in 32% of the meeting (17,973) and 13% of the
interview data set (2,407) being utilized for subsequent analysis. To improve reliability, a
second rater read a random selection of 30% of the larger data set and selected content
relevant to the research question. Results of a two-waymixed-model intraclass correlation
(McGraw & Wong, 1996) found an excellent level of agreement (R = .91, p < .001).
In line with guidance provided by Braun and Clarke (2006), a detailed step-by-step
analysis was conducted on this subset of data. Data were read carefully to identify
emerging categories based on similarities and differences in underlying meaning. Data
units and categories were then organized into broader themes based on commonalities in
content, creating larger data segments (McLeod, 2001). These were compared and
contrasted to establish theme boundaries so that differences in the various ways
information sharing was either facilitated or hindered could be refined. This process
allowed data to be grouped intomeaningful concepts that could bediscussed in relation to
theories whilst still maintaining the language practitioners used (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
To minimize subjectivity, inter-rater reliability was conducted on 30% of this subset of
data with results of a two-way mixed-model intraclass correlation showing an excellent
level of agreement (R = .83, p < .001). Differences were discussed between the two
raters, which resulted in absolute agreement.
Results
In order to explore changes in information sharing and to identify factors that facilitated
and hindered these processes, results are presented as follows:
(1). SME ratings of communication and SSA at Strategic and Tactical levels across three
time points, providing a broad overview of performance changes;
(2). Thematic analysis of meetings and post-incident interview transcripts to provide
context and examples of how factors facilitated and hindered interteam informa-
tion sharing. Frequency of themes across Strategic and Tactical meetings is
provided to highlight changes over time.
Overview of changes in performance
Table 2 provides an overview of SMEs assessments of team performance across the 9-hr
period.
Strategic meetings
According to SME ratings, communication and SA development were effective during the
early and later phase of the incident, with agencies exchanging information clearly and
concisely, and demonstrating shared appreciation of the situation and risks involved
(‘Good, clear exchange of information from all agencies. Key lines agreed between three
blue lights [emergency services]. Allocation of response tomost appropriate persons’ and
‘Especially clear picture of scene and sectors’, SMEobservers). According to SMEs, prior to
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mostmeetingsCommanders fromCategory 1 agencies ‘held smaller informal pre-briefings
in order to exchange information and plan strategies for coordinating activities in the
larger meetings’. However, this did not occur before the third meeting, corresponding
with SME ratings of poorer communication and SSA. For example, a second incident
(helicopter crash) occurred prior to the third meeting, but discussion of this new event
was limited, preventing agencies from updating their shared understanding of the
situation and how this impacted goals and resources (‘Not clear on new incident. No new
review of objectives’, SME observer).
Tactical meetings
Effectiveness of communication and SSA improved over time. Initially, the information
shared was very limited and lacked detail, creating difficulties for agencies to develop a
shared understanding of the situation (‘Scene situation report being collectively discussed
but not definitively confirmed amongst Police and Fire colleagues. A collectively agreed
and commonly understood situational assessment was not reached’, SME observer).
Subsequent improvements in communication and SSA coincidedwith Commanders from
Category 1 agencies permanently collocating outside of formalmeetings in order to speed
up the exchange of information.
Thematic analysis
Results of thematic analysis indicate that ability to share and utilize information in a timely
manner was hindered by two factors: articulation of information (38.01% of word count)
and SSA (11.17%). In line with the concept of knowledge boundaries, the theme of
‘articulation of information’ refers to the ability to communicate relevant information in a
manner that can be easily understood by others, such as avoiding use of acronyms, agency-
specific terminology, or irrelevant information. In line with the NDM definition of ‘SSA’,
this theme refers to the ability of agencies to form an accurate shared understanding of
what is happening on the incident ground and how this might progress. Ability to
effectively share information was facilitated by two factors: rationale (40.25%), and roles
and procedures (12.35%), both of which relate to Data/Frame Theory and frame-of-
reference, as will be discussed. The theme of ‘rationale’ refers to members providing a
reason for why information was requested or provided. The theme of ‘roles and
procedures’ refers to agencies providing clarification regarding their own roles and
procedures in relation to the incident or making reference to those of another agency.
Table 2. Performance ratings in Strategic (SCG) and Tactical Command Group (TCG) meetings
SCG meeting TCG meeting
10 a.m.–
1 p.m.
1 p.m.–
4 p.m.
4 p.m.–
7 p.m.
10 a.m.–
1 p.m.
1 p.m.–
4 p.m.
4 p.m.–
7 p.m.
Communication 90% 75% 79% 68% 44% 100%
Situation awareness 86% 50% 75% 54% 63% 75%
Number of
observations
12 8 8 12 8 8
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Similar to patterns in SME ratings, barriers were predominantly higher in the first and
second Tactical meetings (see Table 3) and the third Strategicmeeting (see Table 4). This
coincided with longer meeting durations (see Table 1). Facilitators were also predom-
inantly higher in these same meetings, suggesting an inability to discriminate between
effective and ineffective information sharing strategies. As will be further discussed,
problems related to agencies sharing too much information or redundantly repeating
discussions rather than ensuring that the information shared was concise and relevant to
recipients (as would be advocated by DSA). This resulted in meetings lasting longer than
scheduled and prevented information from being exchanged across hierarchical levels.
Direct quotes are provided (see Table 5) to support themes, but identifiers have been
removed in order to preserve anonymity, most notably practitioner names [name], and
locations [location]. The symbol ‘xxx’ refers to content that was inaudible or
indecipherable.
Barriers
Shared SA
At a Tactical level, limitations in understanding what was happening on the incident
ground, why and how this might progress were particularly prevalent during the early
phase but reduced as the incident progressed (Table 3). During the first Tactical
meeting, members only had access to minimal information about the incident,
resulting in difficulties with developing an accurate understanding of the key risks
involved such as types of hazardous materials, and how the three sectors linked to
one another (Table 5, examples 1 and 2). Much of this information was still
Table 3. Percentage of facilitators and barriers to information sharing across Tactical meetings
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Total
Facilitator
Rationale 6.62 2.09 4.85 4.41 2.35 20.32
Roles and procedures 2.49 1.61 2.14 6.24
Total 9.11 3.70 4.85 6.55 2.35 26.56
Barrier
Articulation of information 1.87 4.99 1.81 2.62 5.05 16.34
Inaccurate situation awareness 2.77 5.21 7.98
Total 4.64 10.20 1.81 2.62 5.05 24.32
Table 4. Percentage of facilitators and barriers to information sharing across Strategic meetings
1st 2nd 3rd 4th Total
Facilitator
Rationale 2.79 5.04 6.49 5.54 19.36
Roles and procedures 2.35 0.39 2.51 0.76 6.01
Total 5.14 5.43 9.00 6.30 25.87
Barrier
Articulation of information 3.58 2.02 14.03 0.05 19.68
Inaccurate situation awareness 1.44 1.44 0.27 3.15
Total 5.02 3.46 14.03 0.32 22.83
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unavailable during the second Tactical meeting, despite being discussed during the
first Strategic meeting.
Strategic initially had access to more information as a consequence of the Fire
Commander attending the incident ground to gain a firsthand account of what was
happening. However, Tactical were reliant on formal messages sent via radio from the
incident ground, which initially lacked detail (example 4). Overlaps in initial meetings
prevented Strategic from sharing more detailed information with Tactical, and such
informationwas not forthcoming from the incident ground during this period, resulting in
differences in understanding between hierarchical levels. As a consequence, the ability of
Tactical to identify key priorities on the incident ground and to coordinate the activities of
Operational teams was affected, leading to delays in emergency responders attending to
all three incident sectors (e.g., over an hour before responders were deployed to rescue
and treat casualties in sector three).
Not only did lack of information impact on the development of SA, but initial
limitations in understanding the situation subsequently made it difficult for Tactical to
identify what additional information they would need to enhance their SA, leading to
further delays in accessing relevant information. Thus, there appeared to be a reciprocal
interaction between SA and accessing relevant information. For example, a representative
from the gas company was not requested to attend the first Tactical meeting, despite
reports of a potential gas leak on the incident ground being known to Strategic. This
resulted in Tactical making decisionswithout a comprehensive appreciation of risks (e.g.,
responders deployed to zones at potential risk of gas leaks and explosions). This key
information regarding gas risks only became available during the third Tactical meeting
(example 3).
Articulation of information
There were a number of occasions when the information available to one or more
members of the group was not shared at the point in time when it would have been most
relevant to do so. This was usually the result of agencies failing to articulate information in
a language that others could easily understand due to use of acronyms or words with
different semantic meanings. Consequently, agencies were unable to identify when the
information they had held relevance to discussions, resulting in them returning to topics
already covered to provide delayed information updates (example 5). These repetitions
were a key cause of meetings overrunning and overlapping across hierarchical levels.
Messages also sometimes contained an excess of detail, not all ofwhichwas relevant to
other teams (examples 6 and 7). This was the result of members seeking to provide all of
the information their agency possessed rather than matching the information provided to
the requirements of the audience and filtering out irrelevant information. Consequently,
meeting lengths were further prolonged (example 8). At a Tactical level, discussions
became more concise by the third meeting (Table 3), which coincided with Category 1
responders deciding to remain permanently collocated. This smaller group was able to
more readily exchange, discuss, andmake sense of information and agree common frames
or viewpoints so that relevant information could be sourced in a more constructive way
during larger meetings. At a Strategic level, the lack of conciseness during the third
Strategic meeting also coincided with changes in coordination. Whereas Category 1
responders held smaller briefings to share and integrate information prior to the first,
second, and fourth meetings, they were unable to do so in advance of the third meeting,
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affecting their ability to keep discussions more focused to access relevant information
during the larger meeting.
Facilitators
Rationale
Across the course of the incident, there were many occasions when members provided a
rationale for why information was being shared, particularly with regard to resources and
incident management (example 9). Similarly, there were many occasions whenmembers
provided a rationale for why information was needed (example 10). From a Data/Frame
Theory perspective, it is possible that these activities helped to clarify the frame that the
speaker adopted making it easier for others to interpret what was needed.
In line with this, during post-incident interviews Commanders noted that getting
others to understand why they needed information could be challenging but was
important for quickly accessing this so that plans could be formulated to address goals
(example 11). For example, Fire needed details of the total number of people known to be
located across the incident ground in order to provide a stopping point for investing
resources into conducting rescues. Police were responsible for sourcing such informa-
tion, and once they understood the significance of this for achieving shared goals, they
informed Fire that the information could not be sourced to the level of accuracy needed to
be confident that all casualties were rescued. Fire was then able to alter their strategy and
resourceplans accordingly, accepting that the scenewouldneeddismantling to ensure no
casualties remained unaccounted for. Thus, the operation would last for a period of days
or weeks rather than hours.
Roles and procedures
Another facilitator of effective information sharing was providing clarification regarding
the roles and procedures of component teams. Not all teams were equally familiar with
one another (e.g., Category 1 and 2 responders were less familiar with one another), and
so providing this type of information appeared to enable them to develop a shared ‘frame’
regarding capabilities across the MTS for dealing with the specific incident. Accurately
demonstrating knowledge of another team’s roles was also beneficial for gaining quicker
access to relevant information. For example, the Fire Commander’s accurate understand-
ing of the roles and remits of the Royal Air Force during the third Strategicmeeting allowed
quick access to the assistance needed for transporting heavy specialist equipment to the
scene using Air Force assets (example 12).
Similarly, in recognizing the roles and remits of British Transport Police, Fire was able
to quickly provide support to this agency (example 13). Whilst Fire’s subgoal was to
rescue casualties, British Transport Police needed to secure evidence to investigate the
cause of the rail incident and assess whether it was a criminal matter or accident. Both
parties understood one another’s subgoals and had a shared understanding of the order in
which these needed to be prioritized. Such knowledge also enabled them to quickly
identify mutually beneficial strategies. Both parties also understood that the problemwas
specific to their agencies and arranged to discuss it separately rather than causing
disruptions by discussing information of irrelevance to other component teamswithin the
wider meeting.
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During post-incident interviews, Commanders reflected on the importance of being
aware of one another’s roles, remits, and procedures for accessing the information
needed (example 14). In particular, practitioners noted how useful training or
previously working together was for gaining such knowledge prior to an incident
where possible.
Discussion
This research aimed to identify examples of concrete behaviours that facilitate and hinder
interagency information sharing in extreme environments. Findings highlight that poor
SSA, use of agency-specific terminology, and failure to be concise delay interteam
information sharing. Conversely, adopting communication behaviours that create
common ‘frames’ for interpreting messages and understanding information needs, such
as providing a rationale for why information was requested or provided, and articulating
roles, and responsibilities facilitates the sharing of relevant information. Conducting
smaller, spontaneous briefings with agencies that have primacy over managing an
incident helps agencies to process information in order to promote more concise and
targeted focus on sourcing and sharing information during larger meetings, potentially
reducing cognitive load. Taken together, findings indicate that both promoting shared
frames and adopting a networked structure can improve the relevance and speed of
information exchange within dynamic MTS environments.
Information sharing barriers and facilitators
As NDM research highlights, the complexity of dynamic environments often places
decision-makers under increased cognitive load (Klein, 2008; Lipshitz et al., 2001),
reducing capacity for processing information (House, Power, & Alison, 2014). DSA
highlights the importance of sharing information of relevance to the function of the
recipient in order to improve their ability to complete their function without becoming
overloaded (Stanton et al., 2006). From a Data/Frame Theory perspective (Klein et al.,
2006a, 2006b), cognitive effort can also be reducedby adopting ‘frames’ that allowpeople
to select what information they attend to. The current study sought to advance DSA and
Data/Frame Theory by identifying concrete examples of behaviours that can improve
information sharing, making abstract concepts more tangible for practitioners to adopt.
Whilst Data/Frame Theory focuses specifically on how individuals selectively attend to
information, we also focus on the role of the sender and how their communication
behaviours can influence whether the recipient attends to information.
Overall, findings suggest that there are concrete behaviours that both the sender and
recipient can adopt to improve access to relevant information. For example, in line with
knowledgeboundaries research (Kotlarsky et al., 2015), findings suggest that information
should be communicated by the sender in a way that makes it easier for the receiver to
understand and recognize the relevance of. This can be achieved by avoiding specialist
terminologies (Bechky, 2003) and adopting common ‘frames’ for interpreting words
(Boland &Tenkasi, 1995). In contrast to previous research, findings also demonstrate that
differences in using and interpreting terminologies can result in delayed information
sharing across the MTS. For example, practitioners being unable to identify the relevance
of the information they possessed to discussions taking place due to inconsistencies in
words used to describe the same objects and concepts led to repetition as they returned to
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topics already covered to introduce new information. This caused interagency meetings
to overrun, creating disparity in SA anddisrupting the ability for command levels to update
one another.
It should be noted that, in the context of how these teams usually operate, it is unusual
for a member of Strategic Command to attend the incident ground to gain a firsthand
overview of the scene. Consequently, it is also unusual that Strategic would have greater
access to operational information than Tactical as information would usually be passed
from the incident ground to Tacticalwhowould provide a condensed version to Strategic.
However, initial inability to share information across command levels had a long-standing
impact on Tactical, delaying their ability to identify what further information would be
needed to improve SA (e.g., recognizing the potential for a gas leak and requesting gas
company representatives to be present in meetings). Given that disasters are often
characterized by a need to complete tasks urgently (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006),
restrictions to receiving and making sense of information pose implications for rapidly
responding to threats (Rankin et al., 2013). The knock-on effects of barriers to
information sharing across command levels on identifying what was happening and
how to reduce risk highlight the importance of identifying ways to promote access to
better quality, relevant information from the incident ground, particularly during early
incident phases.
Findings also reinforce the importance of only sharing information that is relevant to
the functions of the other agencies attending interagency meetings and delivering
messages concisely. From a DSA perspective, sharing toomuch information increases the
cognitive load of the recipient (Stanton et al., 2006). Current findings indicated that
failing to concisely communicatemessages resulted in agencies disengaging because they
felt this information was irrelevant and prolonged interteam meetings unnecessarily. As
with failing to communicate using a common, shared language, failing to be concise also
caused meetings to overrun, which prevented information from being distributed across
the wider network. This suggests that in a time-constrained MTS, one way in which DSA
may be improved is by communicating concisely and using a common language ‘frame’.
Additionally, findings indicate that providing a rationale for why information is being
requested or shared can both speed up access to and encourage attention to be paid to
relevant information by developing a common frame for interpreting information
requirements. This may enable members to understand the relevance of information for
coordinating subgoals, potentially encouraging them to pay attention to messages by
making them easier to interpret (Jarvenpaa & Keating, 2011). Similarly, providing
information about agencies’ roles and remits also appeared to create a common frame for
viewing the problem, how each agencywas seeking to resolve it and overlaps in subgoals,
enabling agencies to better understand one another’s capabilities, where coordination is
required and what information needs to be shared as a consequence.
Findings also indicate that holding smaller briefingsprior to largermeetings can reduce
redundant and repetitive deliberation. Schraagen and Van de Ven (2011) have previously
highlighted the value of adopting decentralized networks rather than centralized
authority structures for improving access to information during disaster management.
Within networked structures, information is sharedhorizontally and vertically throughout
the organization so that people are able to access the information needed, even if the
source of this information comes from another team, unit, or agency. Within the current
disaster exercise, there were examples of Category 1 agencies seeking to adopt aspects of
a network structure alongside the hierarchical structure, such as Tactical responders
deciding to remain permanently collocated, and Strategic responders conducting pre-
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briefings prior to meetings. In line with Schraagen et al. (2010), adopting these network
strategies enabled these responders to share andmake sense of informationmore rapidly.
Forming these smaller collective groups may also prevent information overload by
allowing responders to strike a better balance betweenmanaging information sharing and
coordinating subgoals. For example, Category 1 responders were able to utilize larger
meetings to provide a coordinated overview of the incident and actions underway, and to
focus on seeking information from Category 2 agencies to inform planning for particular
subgoals. Consequently, meetingswere shorter in duration, leading to fewer overlaps and
allowing information sharing between command levels. These findings suggest that, in
dynamic environments, adopting network structures may be beneficial for promoting a
balance between SSA and DSA, allowing agencies to distribute information more
efficiently. However, in order for information to be shared in the first instance, substantial
efforts still need to be made to manageably obtain and understand information before it
can be shared. This requires a balance between investing resources for gathering and
sharing information, as obtaining and exchanging information simultaneously is difficult.
Limitations
A qualitative approach was adopted to contribute to understanding what facilitates
interteam information sharing in extreme environments. Qualitative analysis is often
criticized on the grounds of subjectivity, which poses implications for data interpretation.
To address this, inter-rater reliability was conducted with a second rater and interview
transcripts and SME observations were used as additional sources for data triangulation.
However, it would be beneficial for future research to conduct more in-depth interviews
to explore practitioners’ personal reflections of the behaviours that improve information
sharing and compatible interpretation. Although this research demonstrates the value of
developing shared frames for understanding roles and remits, and information require-
ments, these strategies may require communicators to expend additional cognitive
resources to focus onwhat information to provide,why and how to communicate this in a
way that can be easily processed by others. Conducting in-depth interviews using
methods such as cognitive task analysis may be beneficial for understanding these trade-
offs.
Additionally, as the data were generated during a large-scale exercise, it may not fully
reflect all complexities present in real disasters. Gaining research access to real incidents
is unlikely due to their unpredictability and risks posed to safety. However, the national
live exercise was developed by emergency service practitioners in order to be immersive
and to parallel themany complexities of real disasters as closely as possible. Given that the
focus of this researchwas on information sharing in disasters, thismay also raise questions
regarding generalizability to other contexts. However,MTSs are frequently formed to deal
with a wide range of challenges in extreme environments such as financial crises and
health care issues, in addition to public security and safety. These environments share
many similar features such as time pressure, lack of, excessive or incomplete information,
risk, and uncertainty, thereby increasing the relevance of findings to wider audiences.
Practical implications
In recognition of the difficulties of interagency communication during disasters, the UK
Home Office introduced the national Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Pro-
gramme (JESIP) in 2012. To date, JESIP has predominantly focused on Category 1
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responders rather than wider support agencies, adopting strategies such as use of joint
aide memoires and universal lexicon, in line with the recommendations of knowledge
boundaries research (Kotlarsky et al., 2015). Findings of this study highlight that itmay be
beneficial to expand the remit of this training to includeCategory 2 responders to improve
the ability of all agencies that could be involved in disaster response to share information
across the wider network.
Findings also suggest that it may be beneficial to introduce training programmes to
promote communication behaviours that facilitate common frames for interpreting
messages and understanding information needs. These behaviours include providing a
rationale for information shared and requested, alongwith clarifying roles and remits, but
future research may identify additional concrete behaviours that facilitate the develop-
ment of these common frames. The value of this approach is that training can be delivered
within agencies, andmore frequently than large-scale exercises, butwith benefits for both
intra- and interagency communication. Previous research into developing common
frames-of-reference for use of language in military contexts demonstrates that even short
periods of classroom-based training (less than an hour) can increase information sharing
and coordination (Firth et al., 2015). However, it is also important to recognize the
practical limitations for adopting these types of communication behaviours. For example,
the time pressures associated with decision-making in extreme environments may
sometimes make it difficult to provide rationales for why information is needed or shared.
Further research should examine the impact of adopting such practices on cognitive load
within the context of complex and time-critical environments.
Another potential avenue for supporting information sharing may be to utilize
technology, including instant messaging functions. These systems allow users to
exchange time-stamped text, audio, picture and video messages securely and instantly
across geographical locations, enabling information to be shared across Command levels
regardless of whether meetings overlap. Sharing images and videos may also enable
Tactical and Strategic levels to gain a more informative overview of the incident ground
during the early phases without physically attending the incident. However, protocols
would still need to be established to develop shared frames for promoting the effective
exchange of information across this system, similar to those discussed above. It may also
be necessary to assign dedicated roles (similar to loggists who are responsible for keeping
records of decision processes) as it would be cognitively demanding to both monitor and
update systems in addition to engaging in discussions during meetings.
The corporate domain has adopted a range of other technological support tools to
promote information sharing, from providing remote team members with the ability to
determine when to contact other members, to the management of shared activity (Scott,
Cummings, Graeber, Nelson, & Bolia, 2006). Technological systems could be adapted to
incorporate the nuances required at each command level of disaster response. For
example, at an operational level exact geolocation information could be incorporated into
remote team member tracking and imposed onto a map of the incident area. This would
provide Tactical and Strategic levels with an understanding of where their personnel
currently are, what their current task is and if they are available to provide an update
without interrupting their task. Bothmedical andmilitary domains are alreadymaking use
of technologies in similar ways (Bardram & Bossen, 2005; Fitzpatrick & Ellingsen, 2012),
and it would be beneficial for future disaster response and communication research to
draw on these domains to identify where adaptive technology could support DSA in ad
hoc MTS.
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